The options market first developed in the 1970s. Since that time, options for the purchase and sale of listed stocks have traded domestically only on floor-based exchanges, for example, the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). The method of trading options contracts in these floor-based environments is known as an “open outcry” system because trading takes place through oral communications between market professionals at a central location in open view of other market professionals. In this system, an order is typically relayed out to a trader standing in a “pit.” The trader shouts out that he has received an order and waits until another trader or traders shouts back a two-sided market (the prices at which they are willing to buy and sell a particular option contract), then a trade results. In an effort to preserve this antiquated system of floor-based trading, the transition to and use of computer-based technology on these exchanges has been slow. Although some processes that take place on these floor-based exchanges have been automated or partially automated, they are not fully integrated and, in fact, many processes continue to function manually. As a result, there are many problems with the existing floor-based system that have caused large inefficiencies and inadequacies in order handling and price competition in the options market, and have harbored potential for abuse and mistakes.
By way of background, several of the floor-based markets rely on the skills of market professionals, known as specialists, who are responsible for maintaining an orderly market and providing liquidity. Specialists accept orders, establish prices for a particular series of options and allocate trades among market professionals. In return for accepting these responsibilities, specialists oftentimes are assured minimum participation rights in the trading activity that occurs in the pit. As is discussed below, this participation right is not exercised over the smaller-size public customer market orders that trade with the single display systems. Instead, it is up to a specialist to claim the minimum amount of trading through the orders that are routed into the pit for trade-by-trade execution.
Specialists are part of a larger class of market professionals, known as market makers, who like specialists, are responsible for maintaining liquidity in the market. Market makers fulfill this responsibility by ensuring that there is always a two-sided market through calling out prices (quotations) at which they are both willing to buy (bid) and sell (offer) a particular option contract and honoring those quotations when trading with incoming orders. In the traditional open outcry system, market makers call out these quotations each time an order is routed into the trading pit. Over time, each of the existing options exchanges has developed systems to track the best quotation. What generally happens is that market makers call out quotations which are manually entered into a system that tracks and displays the single best bid and best offer for the entire trading pit at any given time. As the market makers continue to call out new quotations, the system is updated to reflect the current best bid and best offer. In their existing state, these quotation systems do not track or identify which market maker called out the quote currently displayed or the number of contracts (size) for which the market maker is willing to honor at that quotation. As is discussed below, these systems simply display a single quotation for the entire pit that is generally understood to be valid (firm) for only smaller-sized orders, for example 10 contracts, and for only certain types of orders, for example public customer orders entered on an exchange for immediate execution at the existing market price (the best bid or offer) known as “market orders.” The floor-based exchanges generally have procedures for the automatic execution and allocation of these smaller-sized public customer market orders at the displayed quotations through a rotation assignment of the orders among the pit market makers.
Execution through use of the displayed quotation and automatic allocation to market makers does provide a guaranteed market for incoming smaller-sized public customer market orders. However, this system does not provide an incentive for members to make quotations for size larger than the minimum, i.e., 10 contracts from the above example. In fact, often these automatic allocation systems do not permit market makers to make quotations for larger size. Further, because the bid and offer prices for these allocation systems are set by a single quotation, the existing best bid and best offer may not always accurately reflect the desire of each and every market maker, which makes it difficult for market makers to change the quotation to reflect changes in the market. If the market for the option becomes volatile, for example, when the price of the underlying stock fluctuates or if a market maker simply changes his opinion on what a fair price for that option should be, market makers risk being forced to trade at a disadvantageous price displayed on the single quotation system.
On the other hand, market makers must trade at the displayed market price or else update the quoted price if they wish to improve the market. However, members have no incentive to quote a price that improves the market, i.e. quote a higher bid or lower offer than the current displayed market price, because these systems allocate public customer market orders to market makers in turn through a rotation process. Therefore, to what extent an individual market maker is allowed to participate in a particular order is a matter of chance and whether a market maker who quotes a better market is able capture the benefit of his quotation in a particular option series depends upon his location in the allocation rotation.
The ability for a market maker to act independently and to make deep liquid markets is severely inhibited by these single quotation allocation systems. The inherent inadequacies in these single quotation systems stem from the fact that individual market makers' quotations and size are not tracked or identified. As well the size that market makers are willing to trade at the next best prices (prices lower than the best displayed bid or higher than the best displayed offer) is not tracked or identified. These deficiencies make it difficult to assess market depth and liquidity and ultimately impact that quality of the prices customers receive for their orders. What is more, because no record of market quotations exists beyond the single quotation system it is virtually impossible to accurately recreate and document historical market conditions.
As discussed above, these existing single quotation systems generally provide a guaranteed market at the currently displayed best bid or best offer only for incoming smaller-sized public customer market orders. The execution and allocation procedures, however, are not honored for orders not meeting this criteria. Instead, non-marketable orders where a particular price is bid or offered (limit orders), orders above the minimum size, and orders placed by professionals (professional orders), for example, broker-dealers trading for firm accounts and market makers trading from other options exchanges, frequently continue to be quoted on a case-by-case basis by the market makers in the pit. These orders, therefore, do not even receive the benefit of the single quote allocation systems, which despite their shortcomings, at least afford an opportunity for quicker execution at guaranteed prices. In addition, in periods of high volatility or order volume, or similar circumstances in the trading of the underlying security, a procedure known as a fast market may be instituted. When a fast market exists, the displayed quotations are not honored and market professionals generally revert to quoting incoming orders one series at a time until the condition ultimately subsides.
When a limit order cannot be filled immediately either because the price bid or offered is outside the market or because there is inadequate size to fill the order at the volume ordered, the order is placed on a “book.” A book, more accurately a limit book, is a record of outstanding public customer limit orders that can be matched against future incoming orders. Professional orders are usually not allowed on the limit book. At the existing options exchanges, these limit books may be maintained in a manual and/or electronic format. The current systems, however, generally are not integrated with the single quotation systems. Because the systems stand apart, the best bid and best offer for quotations is calculated separately from the best bid and best offer for the limit book. Moreover, professional orders are not generally accounted for in either of these two calculations. As a result, in instances where the limit book matches or betters a displayed quotation, incoming market orders are not traded automatically. In those cases, incoming smaller-size customer market orders utilizing a display quotation system instead must be “kicked out” and announced to the trading pit in open outcry or manually executed against the limit book.
Broadcast of orders on the floor on a case-by-case basis can create a disadvantage for parties wishing to place larger orders. First, trading is not anonymous. Therefore, market makers in the trading pit are able to determine to some extent the identity of the party placing the order and, as a result, oftentimes condition what they are willing to quote on, for example, whether the order is from a public customer or a market professional. Second, the fact that an order for a larger number of options contracts has been placed can have an effect on the price of the underlying stock. Persons overhearing the order placed on the floor market can “trade ahead”, that is, buy or sell the underlying stock in anticipation of the owner of the options contracts exercising its options. Trading ahead violates market rules, however, because a large number of people are aware of orders placed on floor markets, effective policing of parties that trade ahead is impractical.
Under the current infrastructure, there is little accountability amongst the individual market makers to make two-sided markets with size and continuously call out quotations. The single quote display systems, on the one hand, looks to the crowd and not individuals to maintain the quotations. The traditional open outcry process, on the other hand, provides market makers with the opportunity to react to whichever orders they want to respond and to determine how they want to respond. For example, with incoming orders not routed through the single quote display systems, market makers often distinguish between public customer and professional orders and vary the quotations they are willing to trade at after learning of the order type, not before. What is more, market makers do not quote size for which they are willing to trade at the next best prices (lower than the best bid and higher than the best offer) or make distinctions on what they are willing to trade with other market professionals at the next best prices.
Beyond the trading processes internal to each option exchange, additional considerations arise when an option is listed on multiple exchanges. In order to assure that an order in a multiply-listed contract receives the best execution price, market professionals are charged with the responsibility of checking the other exchanges' quotations for prices better that the exchange's best bid or best offer and with the responsibility of contacting the other exchange to verify that the quotations are valid. If better quotation exists at another exchange, that exchange's market participants must either trade at that price or change (fade) the quotation. The incoming order is generally not automatically processed and must addressed on a case-by-case basis. This entire process of checking other exchange quotations is dependent upon the originating exchange market professionals' personal efforts to verify the other markets' quotations each time an order comes into the trading pit.
The increasing volume of trades in options contracts, as well as the speed at which price information of underlying stocks is transmitted to consumers, has increased the demand for faster trade execution in today's market. In addition, volatility in the price of underlying stocks that are the basis for options contracts place further pressure on exchanges to execute trades quickly and at an equitable price. Market makers on floor-based markets are limited in the speed at which they can react to market fluctuations and respond with quotations. This limited response speed leads to greater market volatility and lower liquidity because the market makers are less willing to risk trading large numbers of contracts where the price may not be optimal. The disjointed nature of the various manual, and sometimes automated, systems which take place on floor-based exchanges cultivate these deficiencies and, again, make it difficult to assess the true market depth and liquidity and ultimately impact that quality of the prices.